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California's Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 limits California's greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions in 2020 to their 1990 level.  Global climate change is a pressing environmental 
problem, and the best possible public policies will be required to address it.  Therefore, analyses 
of prospective policies must themselves be of high quality, so that policymakers can reasonably 
rely on them when making the critical decisions they inevitably will face.  
 
In 2006, three studies were released indicating that California can meet its 2020 target at no net 
economic cost - raising questions about whether opportunities truly exist to substantially reduce 
emissions at no cost, or whether studies reaching such conclusions may simply severely 
underestimate costs.  This paper provides an evaluation of these three California studies.  
 
We find that although opportunities may exist for some no-cost emission reductions, these 
California studies substantially underestimate the cost of meeting California's 2020 target.  The 
studies underestimate costs by omitting important components of the costs of emission reduction 
efforts, and by overestimating offsetting savings that some of those efforts yield through 
improved energy efficiency.  In some cases, the studies focus on the costs of particular actions to 
reduce emissions, but fail to consider the effectiveness and costs of policies that would be 
necessary to bring about such actions.  While quantifying the full extent of the resulting cost 
underestimation is beyond the scope of our study, the underestimation is clearly economically 
significant.  A few of the identified flaws individually lead to underestimation of annual costs on 
the order of billions of dollars.  Hence, these studies do not offer reliable estimates of the cost of 
meeting California's 2020 target.  Better analyses are needed to inform policymakers.  
 
While the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 sets a 2020 emissions target, critical policy 
design decisions remain to be made that will fundamentally affect the cost of California's climate 
policy.  For example, policymakers must determine emission targets for the years before and 
after 2020, the emission sources that will be regulated to meet those targets, and the policy 
instruments that will be employed.  The California studies do not directly address the cost 
implications of these and other policy design decisions, and their overly optimistic findings may 
leave policymakers with an inadequate appreciation of the stakes associated with decisions that 
lie ahead.  As such, California would benefit from studies that specifically assess the cost 
implications of alternative policy designs.  
 
Nonetheless, a careful evaluation of the California studies highlights some important policy 
design lessons that apply regardless of the extent to which no-cost emission reduction 
opportunities actually exist.  In particular, policies should be designed to account for uncertainty 
regarding emission reduction costs, much of which will not be resolved before policies must be enacted.  Also, consideration of the different market failures that lead to excessive GHG 
emissions makes clear that to reduce emissions cost-effectively, policymakers should adopt a 
market-based policy (such as a cap-and-trade system) as the core policy instrument.  The 
presence of specific market failures that may lead to some no-cost emission reduction 
opportunities suggests the potential value of additional policies that act as complements, rather 
than alternatives, to a market-based policy.  However, to develop complementary policies that 
efficiently target such no-cost opportunities, policymakers need better information than currently 
exists regarding the specific market failures that bring about those opportunities. 
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I.  Introduction 
On September 27, 2006, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed into law the California 
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.  The Act sets a statewide greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions limit for 2020 that is equivalent to California’s 1990 emissions level, and gives the 
California Air Resources Board (CARB) substantial discretion to establish policies to achieve 
that target.
1  Global climate change is a pressing environmental problem, and the best possible 
public policies will be required to address it.  While there are divergent views about the merits of 
California’s emissions objectives, most would agree on the importance of California developing 
policies that minimize the economic costs and risks associated with achieving those objectives.  
Toward that end, analyses of the costs of prospective policies can offer insights that inform the 
development of those policies.  However, to be useful, such analyses must be of high quality so 
that policymakers can reasonably rely on them when making the critical decisions they 
inevitably will face.    
Three studies (hereafter the “California studies”) released in 2006, prior to the Act’s 
passage, seek to quantify the emission reduction potential and costs of various measures that 
could be implemented in California.  These studies were performed by California’s Climate 
Action Team (hereafter the “CAT study”), the Center for Clean Air Policy (hereafter the “CCAP 
study”), and David Roland-Holst, a professor of economics at Mills College and an adjunct 
professor at the University of California at Berkeley (hereafter the “Berkeley study”).
2  The 
California studies’ common and overarching conclusion is that California’s 2020 emissions 
target can be achieved through a portfolio of measures that would involve no net economic cost. 
That is, the studies find that California’s target can be achieved through measures whose direct 
costs are outweighed by the offsetting savings they create, making them economically beneficial 
even without considering the emission reductions they may achieve.   
                                                 
1 On October 17, 2006, Governor Schwarzenegger issued Executive Order S-20-06, which orders the California 
Environmental Protection Agency (Cal/EPA) to take the lead role in developing climate change programs, raising 
questions about the respective roles of CARB and Cal/EPA in designing regulations to meet the 2020 target. 
2 Center for Clean Air Policy (CCAP) (2006); California Climate Action Team (CAT) (2006a); and Roland-Holst 
(2006a).  Professor Roland-Holst later published an extension to his original study (2006b), but that second study’s 
findings are driven largely by aspects of his analysis that were present in the original study.  This paper therefore 
focuses on his original study.      
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Given the substantial emission reductions required to meet California’s 2020 target, such 
findings are surprising and differ dramatically from the vast majority of economic analyses of the 
cost of reducing GHG emissions.  The California studies’ surprising findings and their influence 
on the California climate policy debate suggest that their reliability should be carefully 
evaluated.  This paper provides such an evaluation.  While of particular relevance to 
development of California climate policy, lessons that emerge from this evaluation have broader 
implications for similar studies that have been performed — and undoubtedly will continue to be 
performed — at the state and national level.   
Although they differ from many other economic analyses of climate policy, the 
California studies’ findings are reminiscent of similar studies by the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) laboratories that were performed in the run-up to and aftermath of the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations.
3  Like the California studies, the DOE studies suggested that substantial emission 
reductions could be achieved at no net economic cost.
4  Thus, the California studies once again 
raise questions that emerged previously in response to the DOE studies.  Namely, do 
opportunities exist to substantially reduce GHG emissions at no (or even negative) cost?  Or are 
there reasons to believe that studies reaching such conclusions significantly underestimate costs?   
A distinguishing feature of the California and DOE studies is that they rely on “bottom-
up” analyses of policy costs.  That is, they build an estimate of an individual policy’s costs from 
the bottom up by piecing together the components of those costs, including any offsetting 
savings resulting from the policy’s implementation.
5  Researchers have highlighted several 
reasons why some past bottom-up analyses — including the DOE studies — substantially 
underestimated the cost of climate policy, including the omission or incorrect valuation of 
components of those costs (including any offsetting savings).
6  Since many of these flaws can be 
avoided (or their effects can be mitigated) through careful analysis, we evaluate whether the 
California studies represent an advance relative to previous analyses, or if they suffer from 
                                                 
3 Interlaboratory Working Group (1997) and Interlaboratory Working Group (2000).  
4 For example, the 2000 DOE study found that, by 2020, the United States could reduce its carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions by up to 32 percent through a set of policies whose economic benefits (including savings on energy 
expenditures) are comparable to their overall cost.  Interlaboratory Working Group (2000), pp. ES.1, ES.5.  
5 For brevity, we often refer to a policy’s net costs — including offsetting savings — simply as its costs. 
6 For example, see Jacoby (1999); Sutherland (2000); and Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins (1999).  
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similar significant flaws.  We find that many of the well-recognized problems present in prior 
bottom-up analyses are apparent in the California studies, leading those studies to overstate the 
emission reduction potential of policies that they examine, and to understate the cost of 
achieving those reductions.  While quantifying the full extent of the resulting cost 
underestimation is beyond the scope of our review, we can conclude that the underestimation is 
economically significant, because just a few of the identified flaws individually lead to 
underestimation of annual costs on the order of billions of dollars.  While some no-cost emission 
reduction opportunities may exist, it is clear that the California studies arrive at overly optimistic 
conclusions about the economic implications of meeting California’s emissions target.  
It is important to recognize that regardless of what the underlying cost of particular 
emission reduction measures may be, the cost of meeting California’s 2020 target will be 
significantly affected by policy design decisions that policymakers must make in the coming 
years.  For example, policymakers must determine emission targets for the years before and after 
2020, the emission sources that will be regulated to meet those targets, and the policy 
instruments that will be employed — to name just a few key design decisions.   
The California studies do not directly address the implications of alternative policy 
designs, and their overly optimistic findings may lead some policymakers to pay insufficient 
attention to the design decisions that lie ahead, the consequences of which could be dramatic.  
Indeed, California’s own experience with electricity restructuring demonstrates how poor policy 
design and implementation can undermine achievement of well-intentioned policy objectives.  
Therefore, while it is important to recognize the California studies’ shortcomings, it is even more 
important that future analyses assess the implications of alternative policy designs for achieving 
California’s emissions objectives.  In the meantime, our evaluation of the California studies 
highlights some important policy design lessons that apply regardless of the cost of emission 
reduction measures. 
In Section II, we summarize the California studies’ findings.  In Section III, we describe 
how those studies overstate the emission reductions that would be achieved by the policies they 
examine.  In the subsequent two sections, we address the California studies’ assessments of 
emission reduction costs.  The three studies’ findings that substantial reductions can be achieved  
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at no cost are driven by assessments of energy efficiency policies.  As such, the studies mark 
another chapter in the “energy efficiency gap” debate.  Central to this debate are questions about 
the extent to which limited adoption of energy-efficient technologies reflects economic 
inefficiencies that public policy can beneficially address.  In Section IV, we describe this debate 
and provide a framework for understanding both how some no-cost emission reduction 
opportunities can exist, and how analyses like the California studies can underestimate emission 
reduction costs.  In Section V, we identify flaws in the California studies that lead them to 
underestimate significantly the cost of meeting California’s 2020 emissions target.  In Section 
VI, we discuss lessons for the design of climate policy that emerge from an evaluation of these 
studies, and we conclude in Section VII. 
II.  Overview of the California Studies 
The amount of emission reductions necessary to meet the 2020 target established by the 
California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 remains uncertain.  First, although the 
emissions target is California’s 1990 emissions level, CARB has not yet made certain 
measurement decisions that are necessary to determine that level.  Second, the amount of 
emission reductions required to meet the target depends on what emissions would be in 2020 if 
California did not establish emission reduction policies.  That is, the amount of required emission 
reductions depends on the baseline, or business-as-usual, emissions level.  While both the 2020 
emissions target and the baseline emissions level are uncertain, California’s Climate Action 
Team estimates that baseline emissions in 2020 would be 600 million metric tons of carbon 
dioxide equivalent (MMTCO2e), and that 1990 emissions were 426 MMTCO2e.
7  Thus, 
according to the CAT study, California will need to reduce its 2020 emissions by 174 MMTCO2e 
(or 29 percent) from baseline levels in order to meet its target.  To put California’s target in the 
context of other climate initiatives, it is worth noting that the target’s timetable and stringency (in 
                                                 
7 CAT (2006a), p. 64.  A ton of CO2 equivalent emissions is the amount of emissions of any GHG that has the same 
radiative impact as one ton of CO2 emissions.  This common measure of GHG emissions allows emissions of 
different GHGs to be compared and added together into a measure of total GHG emissions.    
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terms of the percentage reduction in emissions that is required) are very similar to the timetable 
and stringency of the target the United States would have faced under the Kyoto Protocol.
8 
The California studies seek to quantify the emission reduction potential and cost of 
numerous measures that might contribute to limiting 2020 emissions.
9  These measures range 
from standards that have already been developed by California regulatory agencies to actions 
that could be undertaken to reduce emissions, but for which an associated policy has not yet been 
developed.  The measures examined by the CAT, Berkeley, and CCAP studies are estimated to 
reduce 2020 emissions by 195 MMTCO2e, 96 MMTCO2e, and 58 MMTCO2e, respectively.   
Table 1 presents emission reduction estimates from these studies, grouped into major categories 
of emission sources and emission reduction measures.  There is significant overlap in the 
measures examined.  For example, the Berkeley and CAT studies both consider emission 
reductions from California’s vehicle GHG emissions standards, and all three studies consider 
opportunities for sequestration of CO2 through afforestation.  In many cases, these studies rely on 
the same underlying analyses for estimates of the emission reduction potential and cost of 
particular measures.   
Based on their analyses, the studies suggest that California can meet its 2020 emissions 
target through measures that, on net, achieve economic gains.  For example, the CAT study 
identifies emission reduction opportunities that exceed the 174 MMTCO2e of reductions that it 
estimates are necessary to achieve the 2020 target.  In so doing, the CAT study concludes that, 
“in 2020 the implementation of the [emission reduction] strategies is expected to increase jobs 
and income by an additional 83,000 and $4 billion, respectively….”
10  The Berkeley study finds 
that more than half of the emission reductions needed to meet the 2020 target can be achieved 
while increasing California’s gross state product (GSP) in 2020 by $55 billion.
11,12  Professor 
                                                 
8 The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimated that the United 
States’ Kyoto Protocol target of seven percent below its 1990 emissions level would have required emissions to be 
reduced to about 30 percent below business-as-usual levels less than 15 years after the Protocol was negotiated.  
U.S. DOE, EIA (1998), p. xiii. 
9 In some cases, these studies evaluate the emission reduction potential and cost of particular actions, rather than of 
the policies that are necessary to bring about those actions.  As we discuss in Section V.B, this distinction is 
important because a policy’s cost can significantly exceed the cost of the actions that it seeks to encourage.   
10 CAT (2006a), p. 65. 
11 Roland-Holst (2006a), p. 2-8.      
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Roland-Holst subsequently released an extension to that study in which he finds that the 
additional reductions necessary to meet the 2020 target can be achieved while still yielding 
comparable economic gains.
13   
Table 1 
 Emission Reductions in 2020 from Measures Examined by the California Studies
1  
(MMTCO2e, with percent of total estimated reductions in parentheses) 
Category
Transportation Emissions
Motor Vehicle GHG Emissions Standards 30 (15.4%) 31 (32.3%)
Measures to Reduce Vehicle Miles Traveled Through 
Improved Land Use and Transportation Infrastructure
27 (13.9%) 11 (18.9%)




Measures to Reduce the Carbon Intensity of 
Electricity Generation
34 (17.6%)
Programs and Standards to Increase Energy 
Efficiency in Buildings
30 (15.3%) 24 (25.0%)
CO2 Sequestration and Non-CO2 GHG Emissions
Measures Targeting Forestry and Agricultural Practices 34 (17.5%) 13 (13.5%) 14 (23.6%)
Measures to Reduce Methane Emissions 6 (3.1%) 14 (14.6%) 17 (28.5%)
Measures to Reduce HFC, PFC, and SF6 Emissions 11 (5.4%) 11 (11.5%) 15 (25.6%)
Other Measures 9 (4.7%) 3 (3.1%) 2 (3.3%)
Total 195 (100.0%) 96 (100.0%) 58 (100.0%)
Notes:
2.  The Berkeley study estimates are based on the "ambitious scenarios" evaluated by that study.
1.  Categories represent our categorization of specific measures described in the underlying studies, and not necessarily categories used by those 
studies.  Blank entries indicate that the study did not investigate measures within a given category.  While the underlying studies provide some 
estimates to the first decimal place (hundreds of thousands of tons), estimates are reported here in millions of tons.  
3.  The CCAP study estimates are for those emission reductions that the CCAP study estimates to have costs of less than $30 per metric ton of CO2 
equivalent.  The total estimate does not match the sum of the categories because of rounding.




While the California studies focus on the aggregate economic impact of the portfolio of 
measures they examine, their findings are largely driven by a subset of measures that target 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 The California studies use economic impacts in 2020 as a proxy for determining whether Californians are made 
better off by emission reduction measures.  However, this is an insufficient basis for concluding that Californians 
would be better off, as it does not account for economic conditions in prior or subsequent years.  For example, a 
policy that forces individuals to sacrifice current consumption in order to make particular investments may increase 
GSP in a future year (e.g., in 2020) as a result of those investments.  But the lost value of current consumption that is 
necessary in order to make those investments may outweigh any positive impact of the investments in future years. 
13 Roland-Holst (2006b).  As noted previously, that second study’s findings are driven largely by aspects of his 
analysis that were present in the original study.  We therefore focus on the original study.    
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improvements in energy efficiency.  In particular, the net economic gains estimated by the 
Berkeley and CAT studies result from their estimates of the impact of California’s vehicle GHG 
emissions standards — which will increase vehicle fuel economy — and programs and standards 
to improve energy efficiency in buildings (e.g., utilities’ energy efficiency programs).
14  The 
Berkeley study estimates that these measures alone would increase GSP by $64 billion in 2020, 
while the remaining measures it examines are estimated to reduce GSP by $8.5 billion in 2020.
15  
Similarly, whereas the CAT study finds that the vehicle GHG emissions standards and energy 
efficiency programs and standards offer annual savings of $10 billion in 2020, it finds that the 
remaining measures it examines impose a net annual cost of $1 billion.
16  The CCAP study does 
not directly estimate the economic impact of the vehicle GHG emissions standards and energy 
efficiency programs and standards.  Moreover, the specific measures that the CCAP study does 
examine are found to impose a net cost on California.  But CCAP combines its estimates of the 
costs of the measures that it does examine with others’ estimates of net savings from the energy 
efficiency measures to conclude that California’s 2020 target can be achieved at no net cost.
17  
Because estimates of the economic impact of energy efficiency measures drive the California 
studies’ findings, much of our assessment of the studies focuses on their analyses of those 
measures. 
To estimate the aggregate emission reduction potential and economic impact of the 
measures it examines, the CCAP study simply sums the emission reduction and cost estimates 
                                                 
14 While there are limited other means by which manufacturers can reduce vehicles’ GHG emissions, the 
predominant means is by improving fuel economy to reduce the amount of gasoline that vehicles burn. 
15 Roland-Holst (2006a), p. 2-8.  Professor Roland-Holst estimates that the vehicle standards alone will increase 
GSP by $50 billion.  In developing this estimate, he relies on the results of analyses that CARB conducted to support 
the development of those standards.  However, Professor Roland-Holst’s estimate of the standards’ impact in 2020 
is approximately ten times greater than CARB’s own estimate of the annualized net savings from the standards.  
Professor Roland-Holst offers no explanation for this dramatic difference.  For CARB’s analysis, see CARB 
(2004a), as revised in CARB (2004b). 
16 Note that these values do not sum to the aggregate economic impact estimated by the CAT study.  This is because 
these values are based on estimates of each measure’s independent economic impact that the CAT study uses as 
inputs to its subsequent economic modeling of the aggregate impact of all measures.  The CAT study does not offer 
estimates of the ultimate economic impact of each individual measure that emerges from that modeling.  It only 
offers an estimate of the aggregate impact of all measures.  Nonetheless, these input values offer a reasonable means 
of determining which measures drive the CAT study’s findings.  Also, the CAT study does not offer any estimate of 
the economic impact of certain measures that it examines, such as improvements in transportation infrastructure, 
effectively treating them as if they have no cost.  CAT (2006b).   
17 CCAP (2006), p. 13.  
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that are independently developed for each measure.  By contrast, the CAT and Berkeley studies 
use results from independent analyses of each measure as inputs to a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model.  These studies’ CGE modeling serves as a means of aggregating the 
individual emission reduction measures’ direct effects, while accounting for some of the indirect 
effects of those measures on statewide economic activity and emissions.   
There are significant shortcomings associated with how the Berkeley and CAT studies 
estimate the aggregate effects of emission reduction measures through CGE modeling.  Meeting 
California’s 2020 target will lead to substantial changes in California’s economy, and its energy 
markets in particular.  For example, adjustments in energy supply and demand associated with 
meeting the 2020 target will lead to changes in energy prices.  As a result of these changes, a 
given measure’s economic impact, which depends on energy prices, may differ significantly 
from what it would be if the measure were the only one being implemented and energy prices 
remained unchanged.  That is, there will be important interactions among measures necessary to 
meet California’s 2020 target.  Properly executed CGE modeling can capture these interactions 
by calculating each measure’s effects while accounting for the implications of all other emission 
reduction measures.  But the Berkeley and CAT studies estimate the direct effects of key 
emission reduction measures outside of the CGE models they employ, as if those measures were 
being conducted in isolation from one another.  The studies then use these estimates of the 
emission reduction measures’ direct effects as inputs to their CGE modeling.  As a result, the 
studies fail to account for important interactions among those measures in estimating their 
aggregate cost and emission reduction potential.   
Although there are significant flaws in the CGE modeling that the California studies 
perform, we focus on the individual analyses of each emission reduction measure that serve as 
inputs to that modeling, as these underlying analyses ultimately drive the models’ results.   
However, in Section III we do address some of the interactions among policies that the studies 
fail to consider in estimating the total emission reduction potential of those policies.   
III. Factors Causing the California Studies to Overstate Emission Reductions 
The California studies fail to account for a number of factors that lead them to overstate 
the emission reduction potential of the measures they examine.  One key omitted factor is  
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emissions leakage, which has long been recognized as a phenomenon that can limit the 
effectiveness of climate policy.  Leakage occurs when market adjustments resulting from a 
regulation cause an increase in emissions that offsets some (or all) of the emission reductions 
directly achieved by that regulation.  While the measures that the California studies examine will 
likely lead to emissions leakage in several ways, the studies do not account for leakage in 
quantifying impacts of many of those policies.  For example, policies considered by the CAT 
study to reduce consumption of out-of-state coal-fired electricity generation would not have the 
expected effect on emissions if that generation is simply reallocated to serve demand in other 
states.
18  Leakage will be particularly problematic for California’s policies because of their 
narrow geographic scope.  Of course, emissions leakage will hinder achievement of California’s 
statewide emission targets only if it leads to offsetting increases in emissions within (rather than 
outside of) the state.  But, regardless of whether leakage leads to offsetting increases in in-state 
or out-of-state emissions, it diminishes the ultimate impact of California’s policies on global 
emissions, and hence their environmental benefits.  
Interactions among policies introduce additional opportunities for emissions leakage.   
Specifically, emission reductions resulting from one policy may diminish the amount of 
additional reductions that regulated entities must achieve (either in-state or out-of-state) to meet 
another policy’s requirements.  Given the policies examined by the California studies, the most 
significant example of this type of leakage is likely that resulting from interaction between 
California’s vehicle GHG emissions standards and federal fuel economy standards.  California’s 
standards have the effect of requiring auto manufacturers to increase the average fuel economy 
of vehicles sold in California.  However, those manufacturers also must meet federal Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards.  Because CAFE standards are average nationwide 
standards, sales of more fuel-efficient vehicles in California make it possible for manufacturers 
to sell less fuel-efficient (higher emitting) vehicles in remaining states while still meeting federal 
CAFE standards.  That is, California’s standards may lead to increased vehicle emissions 
elsewhere in the United States, relative to what those emissions would have been absent 
California’s standards.
19  Hence, while California’s vehicle GHG emissions standards may 
                                                 
18 CAT (2005), p. 64. 
19 For example, as a result of federal CAFE standards finalized in 2006, by 2011, light truck manufacturers will have 
to achieve an average fuel economy that is 16 percent more stringent than the 20.7 mile per gallon standard that was  
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achieve emission reductions within California, they may simply concentrate the costs of meeting 
federal CAFE standards on Californians while having a far smaller net effect on national 
emissions.
20    
Interactions among certain policies also can lead to leakage that creates offsetting 
increases in in-state emissions.  For example, the CAT study includes emission reductions from 
policies specifically promoting biomass electricity generation and from increasing the stringency 
of a renewable portfolio standard (RPS) for electricity generators.
21  However, since biomass is a 
renewable fuel, if the former set of policies increases biomass electricity generation, this will 
lead to an offsetting reduction in the amount of generation from other renewables that is needed 
to meet the RPS requirement.  Therefore, while biomass policies may shift the composition of 
renewable generation used to meet the RPS, they would not increase the total amount of 
renewable generation (or resulting emission reductions) beyond what would be achieved by the 
RPS alone.  Yet, the CAT study adds together the individual effects of each policy without 
considering this interaction. 
Other policy interactions can diminish the total emission reductions achieved by a 
portfolio of policies.  A policy that reduces an activity’s emissions intensity also diminishes the 
emission reductions that can be achieved by a policy that reduces the level of that activity, and 
vice versa.  Therefore, implementation of both policies will have a lesser effect on emissions 
than the sum of each policy’s independent effect.  For example, according to an analysis by 
CARB, improvements in vehicle fuel economy resulting from California’s vehicle GHG 
emissions standards will reduce vehicle emissions by 18 percent in 2020, and 27 percent in 
2030.
22  While the CAT study incorporates these estimated effects of the standards in its 
analysis, it also estimates that “smart land use and intelligent transportation” policies can achieve 
                                                                                                                                                             
in effect until 2004.  However, compliance with California’s more stringent standards will reduce the extent to 
which the fuel efficiency of light trucks sold elsewhere in the United States must be improved in order to meet the 
new federal standards.  U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2006). 
20 Alternatively, it is possible that California’s standards may lead to increased fuel economy in other states because 
of other states’ regulatory actions in response to those standards, or because of manufacturers’ marketing decisions 
in response to California’s standards.  However, if California’s standards lead to increased fuel economy in other 
states, those improvements will be accompanied by additional costs that also would need to be considered.  
21 CAT (2006a), pp. 49, 61. 
22 CARB (2004a), as revised in CARB (2004b), Table 8.2-1.     
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significant emission reductions by substantially reducing vehicle miles traveled.
23  However, 
improvements in vehicle fuel economy will diminish the emission reductions that are achieved 
by reducing vehicle miles traveled, and vice versa.  Similar interactions would exist among 
policies examined in the CAT study that reduce the emissions intensity of electricity generation 
and those that reduce electricity use.  Given that the CAT study’s estimates of emission reduction 
potentials are based on independent analyses of each policy, it is unclear whether that study 
accounts for these interactions.   
In summary, the total emission reduction potential of policies like those examined by the 
California studies is diminished by emissions leakage and policy interactions, some of which 
introduce new opportunities for leakage.  By failing to account fully for these effects, those 
studies overstate the aggregate impact of the examined policies on state and, more importantly, 
national and global GHG emissions.   
IV. The “Energy Efficiency Gap” Debate:  A Framework for Evaluating the California 
Studies 
Assessments of energy efficiency measures drive the California studies’ findings that 
California’s 2020 GHG emissions target can be met at no net cost.  As a result, in many respects, 
those studies represent a new chapter in an on-going debate about the so-called “energy 
efficiency gap.”
24  An understanding of this debate provides a useful framework for evaluating 
the California studies’ estimates of emission reduction costs. 
It is widely recognized that existing technologies can substantially improve the 
economy’s energy efficiency and, in so doing, reduce emissions.  There are broadly two 
perspectives on the cost of more widespread adoption of these technologies.  One group, 
sometimes referred to as “technologists,” asserts that numerous market barriers impede 
widespread adoption of these technologies.  Moreover, they assert that government initiatives to 
overcome these barriers and thereby improve energy efficiency could reduce emissions and also 
realize substantial cost savings through resulting reductions in energy expenditures.  On the other 
hand, most economists maintain that, while technology diffusion is typically a gradual process, 
                                                 
23 CAT (2005), p. 38.   
24 One of the most extensive discussions of this debate appears in the October 1994 issue of Energy Policy.  See 
Huntington, Schipper, and Sanstad (1994).  Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins (1999) offer a more recent discussion.  
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energy efficiency improvements that truly yield cost savings largely will be adopted without the 
need for government intervention.
25  Moreover, economists note that many of the barriers that 
slow or prevent broader adoption of more energy-efficient technologies reflect real economic 
costs associated with their adoption.  Where this is the case, policy intervention that requires or 
encourages adoption of those technologies would be socially costly.  However, some of the 
barriers inhibiting technology adoption reflect true market failures that, if corrected, may both 
improve energy efficiency and yield economic gains.  Figure 1 depicts how efforts to address 
market failures and other market barriers affect energy efficiency and economic efficiency.
26   
Individuals and firms typically voluntarily undertake investments and actions that reduce 
their costs or increase their profits.  But a few types of market failures may inhibit realization of 
some cost-saving energy efficiency improvements.
27  For example, economically desirable 
energy efficiency investments may be foregone because of poor information about the value of 
energy savings they offer.  Moreover, because those who provide new information may be 
unable to capture much of its benefits (i.e., information is a public good), there may be 
insufficient incentives to provide this information.
28  Cost-saving energy efficiency investments 
also may be foregone because of principal-agent problems, such as when the individual financing 
the investment is different from the individual directly benefiting from that investment (e.g., a 
landlord’s investment may reduce a tenant’s electricity bill).  In such cases, various factors may 
prevent those individuals from establishing mutually beneficial agreements to facilitate such 
investments.  These and other market failures imply that some opportunities may exist for “no-
cost” or “negative-cost” policies that improve energy efficiency, reduce emissions, and increase 
                                                 
25 Technology diffusion represents the third of three stages that Josef Schumpeter (1942) distinguishes in the process 
by which new, superior technologies permeate the marketplace.  The first stage is invention, or the development of a 
scientifically or technically new product or process.  The second stage is innovation, or the commercialization of a 
new product or process.  See Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins (2003). 
26 Improvements in energy efficiency involve reductions in energy use per unit of economic activity.  Improvements 
in economic efficiency entail reductions in the cost of existing goods and services, or improvements in their quality. 
27 For further discussion of these market failures, see Jaffe and Stavins (1994).   
28 Similarly, experiences of early technology adopters provide useful information to others considering similar 
investments.  However, early adopters are unlikely to be compensated for providing this information.  Therefore, 
when deciding whether to invest in new technologies, individuals and firms do not fully account for the value of the 
public information that such investments create.  As a result, they may not undertake some socially beneficial 
investments in new technologies that would improve information or reduce costs for later adopters.  
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economic efficiency through resulting cost savings.
29  In Figure 1, implementation of such no-
cost policies is reflected by northeasterly movement (along path A) relative to current conditions.   
Of course, in seeking to address market failures, policymakers must recognize that 
sometimes the cure is worse than the disease.  That is, the cost of a corrective policy may 
outweigh any savings gained by addressing targeted market failures.  Thus, although energy 
efficiency would be increased by going beyond implementation of no-cost policies to eliminate 
all market failures affecting energy efficiency, such efforts would impose net costs and reduce 
economic efficiency, as is indicated by northwesterly movement (along path B) from the 
“Implementation of ‘No-Cost’ Policies” box in Figure 1.  Moreover, while Figure 1 suggests that 
eliminating all market failures may bring about an improvement in economic efficiency relative 
to current conditions, it is possible that the cost of doing so could instead reduce economic 
efficiency relative to current conditions. 
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29 See Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins (2005).  
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While voluntary adoption of some energy efficiency improvements may be limited by 
market failures whose elimination also can improve economic efficiency, many other market 
barriers to voluntary adoption of energy efficiency improvements are factors that cause those 
improvements’ economic costs to be greater than they may at first appear.  Examples include the 
adverse effects that energy efficiency improvements can have on valued attributes of affected 
technologies (e.g., reduced power in more fuel-efficient vehicles) and the costs of learning about 
and adapting to new technologies.  Because such barriers represent real economic costs, 
overcoming them to improve energy efficiency reduces economic efficiency.  This is represented 
by northwesterly movement (along path C) in Figure 1 from elimination of all market failures to 
elimination of all market barriers.   
In summary, the presence of market failures affecting energy efficiency may offer some 
opportunities for no-cost policies that achieve cost savings while reducing energy use and 
associated emissions.  But the extent of such opportunities is more limited than some have 
suggested.
30  Many improvements in energy efficiency may be socially costly for one of two 
reasons.  First, energy efficiency improvements may be impeded by market barriers that 
represent real economic costs, rather than by market failures.  Second, even where market 
failures are present, the cost of policies to address them may exceed resulting savings.   
In evaluating a study that claims to find no-cost emission reduction measures, several 
questions arise that require careful analysis.  Has the study truly identified a market failure that 
provides an opportunity to improve economic efficiency through policy intervention?  Or, has 
the study instead incorrectly estimated the economic costs of the examined measures?  Put 
simply, if opportunities truly exist to reduce costs while reducing emissions, why would potential 
beneficiaries of these opportunities not undertake them voluntarily?  Also, if a market failure is 
present, can policies address that failure without imposing costs that exceed resulting savings?   
While some no-cost emission reduction opportunities may exist, policymakers should not 
lose sight of the fact that costly emission reductions still can be socially beneficial on net if they 
offer sufficient environmental benefits.  Compared with the contentious debate about the extent 
of market failures that offer opportunities for no-cost emission reduction policies, there is 
                                                 
30 See Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins (1999).   
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universal agreement that the core market failure leading to excessive GHG emissions is the 
failure of emitters to internalize the social cost of their emissions, and thereby the social benefit 
of emission reductions.  As Figure 1 depicts, consideration of environmental benefits from 
emission reductions offers additional opportunities to reduce emissions, improve energy 
efficiency, and increase economic efficiency (by moving along path D) — even though such 
efforts will impose direct costs on those that undertake them.  However, justification of emission 
reductions and energy efficiency improvements on these grounds requires critical evaluation of 
both their costs and environmental benefits.  Unfortunately, debates about the extent of no-cost 
emission reduction opportunities that have been reinvigorated by the California studies distract 
attention from important questions about the benefits of emission reductions, and the level of 
costs that those benefits justify.   
V.  Factors Causing the California Studies to Underestimate the Costs of Achieving 
Emission Reductions 
The presence of market failures that affect energy efficiency decisions implies that some 
opportunities for no-cost emission reduction policies may exist.  However, economists have 
identified several flaws that caused prior analyses claiming to identify substantial opportunities 
for such policies to significantly underestimate those policies’ real economic costs.  As we 
describe in this section, many such flaws are apparent in the California studies, causing them to 
severely underestimate the cost of meeting California’s 2020 emissions target.   
Of course, studies finding opportunities for no-cost policies are not the only ones that 
may incorrectly estimate costs.  The points raised in this section should be carefully considered 
in evaluating analyses of any policy.  In fact, some of these points relate to the California 
studies’ assessments of policies found to have positive costs. 
Analyses like those relied on by the California studies seek to estimate a policy’s overall 
economic costs by building an estimate of those costs from the bottom up.  Execution of these 
“bottom-up” analyses requires identifying and correctly estimating each individual component of 
costs, including any offsetting savings, and it requires aggregating those components over 
individuals and firms, as well as over time.  Aggregation of costs and savings over time requires  
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discounting future costs and savings to make comparable costs and savings that occur in different 
years.  Thus, analysts must estimate how individuals and firms discount future cash flows.  
Well-executed bottom-up analyses can, in principle, develop reliable estimates of 
emission reduction policies’ costs.  However, in light of the complexities described above, it is 
not surprising that the California studies incorrectly estimate costs.  Analyses can underestimate 
the costs of emission reduction policies by underestimating the costs of the actions and 
investments that are necessary to reduce emissions, and/or by underestimating the costs of 
policies necessary to bring about those actions and investments.  As we describe below, the 
California studies suffer from both types of flaws.   
A.  Underestimation of the Costs of Actions and Investments to Reduce Emissions  
Analyses may underestimate the costs of emission reductions by omitting important 
components of those costs.  Also, emission reductions arising from improvements in energy 
efficiency generate offsetting savings in the form of reduced future energy expenditures.   
Analyses therefore may underestimate net costs by measuring these future savings incorrectly, or 
by employing inappropriately low discount rates in determining how those savings compare with 
upfront costs.  As we describe below, the California studies underestimate costs both by omitting 
important components of costs and by overstating offsetting savings. 
i.  Omitted Costs 
Omitted costs can range from those that are readily apparent to those that are more subtle 
and difficult to quantify.  In some cases, studies may consider the costs borne by the government 
to administer a policy, but fail to account for costs that individuals and firms incur to achieve the 
emission reductions that the policy targets.  The California studies commit this mistake in 
analyzing the impact of electric utility and state energy efficiency programs.  These programs, 
often referred to as demand-side management (DSM), achieve reductions in electricity use by 
offering rebates and other incentives that encourage individuals and firms to undertake energy 
efficiency improvements.
31  In response to these programs, individuals and firms undertake 
                                                 
31 Some DSM programs raise awareness about opportunities to improve energy efficiency without providing direct 
incentives that target those improvements.  
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energy efficiency improvements because the costs of those improvements are outweighed by the 
combined value of any incentives they receive and the resulting electricity savings.   
There is much debate about the true costs and effectiveness of DSM programs.
32  But 
putting this debate aside, it is clear that the California studies fail to account fully for those 
programs’ costs.  While accounting for the incentives offered by those programs and the 
resulting electricity savings, the California studies ignore the actual costs that individuals and 
firms incur to undertake the targeted actions or investments.
33,34  While difficult to measure, 
these omitted costs can be as great as, or even greater than the value of the electricity savings 
that the studies attribute to DSM programs.  This is because individuals and firms would still 
enjoy net savings — and thereby presumably still be willing to undertake the improvements — 
as long as the costs of their actions or investments are no greater than the combined value of both 
the incentives they receive and the resulting electricity savings.   
Another common category of omitted costs relates to the impact of emission reduction 
efforts on the quality of affected goods and services.  For example, all else equal, making an air 
conditioner more energy efficient may increase its size and weight, and making a car more fuel 
efficient may reduce its acceleration.  While more difficult to quantify than a consumer’s out-of-
pocket expenses for a new technology, costs associated with impacts on the quality of a good can 
be just as important.  In evaluating costs related to quality impacts, one must estimate the value 
that individuals and firms place on those attributes of a good or service that are lost by reducing 
emissions.  Estimates of those costs can be developed through economic (hedonic) analysis, but 
they typically are ignored in bottom-up studies that rely primarily on engineering cost analysis.  
For example, in its analysis of emission reduction opportunities, the CCAP study includes 
emission reductions from adding limestone to Portland cement.  CCAP finds that use of such 
                                                 
32 See Loughran and Kulick (2004) and Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer (2006). 
33 The Berkeley study explicitly acknowledges that it does not account for these private adoption costs.  Roland-
Holst (2006a), p. 2-16.  The CAT study provides less methodological documentation.  However, comparison of its 
estimates of the per-kilowatthour cost for these programs with other estimates of the cost of funding such programs 
suggests that the CAT study also considers only the costs incurred by utilities or the state to fund the programs, and 
ignores costs borne by individuals and firms.   
34 While imposing a cost on the state or utilities that fund them, the incentives themselves do not represent a social 
cost.  Rather, they are a transfer from the ratepayers or taxpayers that fund the programs to those that receive the 
incentives.  But even if the California studies incorrectly treat these incentives as costs, they may still underestimate 
the total cost of these programs if the actual costs of undertaking the targeted actions or investments, which those 
studies omit, exceed the value of the incentives.  As we describe below, this is quite likely.  
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limestone cement blends would reduce both emissions and production costs.  Yet, it also notes 
that “Cal Trans has raised questions about the structural integrity of limestone blends.”
35  While 
including the estimated cost savings from limestone blends in its analysis, CCAP does not 
estimate the cost of reduced structural integrity or of measures that cement users might undertake 
to mitigate these potentially adverse effects.   
Some bottom-up analyses attempt to account for impacts that emission reductions may 
have on the quality of affected goods, but even these efforts often fall short of fully accounting 
for those impacts.  For example, the California studies’ estimates of the economic impact of 
California’s vehicle GHG emissions standards are based on CARB’s analysis of those standards.  
CARB estimates the cost of meeting the standards while maintaining vehicle acceleration, 
weight, and other attributes at levels anticipated in 2009 — the year that the standards come into 
effect.
36  However, this approach fails to consider the standards’ impact on the costs of and 
opportunities for further improvements in vehicle performance beyond 2009 levels.  If 
Californians place any value on further improvements in vehicle performance beyond 2009 
levels, and the standards raise the costs of or reduce opportunities for those performance 
improvements, CARB will have omitted a significant component of its standards’ economic cost. 
There are several other sources of emission reduction costs that bottom-up analyses like 
the California studies can overlook.  For example, in adopting new technologies, individuals and 
firms may incur costs to learn about and adapt to using those technologies.  While such costs 
may be quite small for any one individual or firm, they can significantly affect the aggregate cost 
of a technology’s widespread adoption.  Indeed, estimates of the substantial nationwide or 
statewide cost savings that can result from adopting more energy-efficient technologies often 
represent the aggregation of very small individual or firm-level savings.
37  Thus, these small 
individual or firm-level savings could be outweighed by equally small costs associated with 
learning about and adapting to new technologies. 
                                                 
35 CCAP (2005b), p. 6. 
36 CARB (2004a), p. 58. 
37 Sanstad, Hanemann, and Auffhammer (2006) note that the “magnitudes of [energy efficiency] savings may be 
quite modest … from the individual’s perspective, what’s on the sidewalk may not be a $20 bill but rather a penny 
or a nickel.”  
  19
ii.  Overestimation of Future Savings from Reduced Energy Use 
The net cost of some emission reductions, particularly those from energy efficiency 
improvements, reflects both new costs and offsetting reductions in future energy expenditures.  
Thus, analyses can underestimate the net cost of emission reduction measures by overestimating 
the value of the energy expenditure savings that those measures create.      
Analyses can overestimate the reduction in energy use realized from adopting more 
energy-efficient technologies, in part because such estimates often are based on highly controlled 
studies that do not reflect typical real-world conditions.
38  Moreover, even if a study accurately 
estimates the reduction in energy use enjoyed by those undertaking energy efficiency 
improvements, differences between the price that consumers would have paid for the conserved 
energy and the actual cost of producing that energy can cause resulting private cost savings to 
differ from corresponding social cost savings.  That is, emission reductions that are no-cost 
opportunities for the individuals and firms undertaking them will not necessarily be no-cost 
opportunities from a societal standpoint, and vice versa.  
The California studies significantly overestimate the social cost savings from energy 
efficiency measures by focusing on the private savings enjoyed by those undertaking the 
measures, and failing to account for substantial differences between those private savings and the 
actual social cost savings that the measures create.  For example, the CAT study estimates that 
electricity efficiency measures can reduce annual electricity use by 51 million megawatthours by 
2020.
39  The study values these annual savings at $5.6 billion by multiplying the reduction in 
electricity use by a forecast of the electricity rate that consumers would pay in 2020, which is 11 
cents per kilowatthour (kWh).
40  This approach is a reasonable method of estimating private cost 
savings from electricity efficiency measures.  However, it leads the CAT study to overestimate 
social cost savings from those measures because retail electricity rates that consumers pay cover 
both electricity generation costs and fixed costs, such as transmission, distribution, and 
administrative costs.  Energy efficiency improvements reduce electricity generation, and thereby 
                                                 
38 For example, see Metcalf and Hassett (1999). 
39 CAT (2006b). 
40 For example, see CAT (2006b), p. 21.  The Berkeley study’s description of how it estimates savings from these 
measures suggests that it takes a similar approach.  Roland-Holst (2006a), p. 2-16.  
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reduce generation costs, but have a more limited (and perhaps no) effect on fixed costs that 
utilities recover through electricity rates.  As a consumer reduces her electricity use, a significant 
portion of her savings therefore comes at the expense of other ratepayers, who must bear a 
greater share of those fixed costs (such as through increased rates).  In light of this, use of 
California’s retail electricity rates overstates the value of the social costs that can actually be 
avoided (i.e., the social cost savings that can be realized) by electricity efficiency measures 
examined in the California studies.
41   
Some indication of the extent to which the California studies overstate social cost savings 
from electricity efficiency measures is offered by a 2003 California Energy Commission (CEC) 
report.
42  This report, which examines opportunities for such efficiency measures in California, 
specifically addresses the social cost savings from those measures.  For the efficiency measures 
that the report deems to be economical, the average cost of the electricity generation that can be 
avoided by those measures is 7 cents per kWh of demand reduction.
43  This estimate of social 
cost savings is nearly 40 percent less than the electricity rate of 11 cents per kWh used by the 
CAT study, which captures the private savings from reductions in electricity use.  Had the CAT 
study instead focused on social cost savings by using the CEC’s estimates of avoided generation 
costs, the CAT study’s estimate of annual savings from electricity efficiency measures in 2020 
would be reduced by about two billion dollars.
44     
The California studies also incorrectly measure the social cost savings from reductions in 
gasoline consumption that would result from California’s vehicle GHG emissions standards.  For 
                                                 
41 During periods of peak electricity demand (e.g., afternoon hours in the summer), the cost of electricity generation 
can exceed electricity rates, so that those rates understate the social cost savings from reducing electricity demand.  
However, the vast majority of demand reductions from potential energy efficiency measures that have been 
identified in California would occur during the “base load” period when total electricity demand (and the 
incremental cost of generation) is at its lowest.  California Energy Commission (2003). 
42 CEC (2003). 
43 The CEC develops three estimates of the cost of avoided electricity generation that differ depending on whether 
that generation is avoided during periods of base load, shoulder, or peak electricity demand.  Our 7 cent per kWh 
estimate is a weighted average of these three cost estimates.  The weight assigned to each estimate reflects the 
corresponding demand period’s share of the total demand reduction that the CEC finds to be achievable through 
economical energy efficiency measures.  CEC (2003), pp. 7-11. 
44 The Berkeley study does not provide the values that it employs to estimate savings from these measures.  But its 
estimate of the annual net impact of these measures (accounting for upfront costs and offsetting electricity savings) 
is nearly $14 billion in net savings.  This suggests that the overstatement of annual savings that would result from its 
focus on private, rather than social, cost savings would be in the billions of dollars.  Roland-Holst (2006a), p. 2-19.     
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example, the CAT study estimates savings from those standards based on the reduction in 
gasoline expenditures that drivers are expected to enjoy.
45  However, a significant share of the 
price of gasoline in California is attributable to state and federal taxes.  This share of the 
reduction in gasoline expenditures enjoyed by drivers does not represent a true cost savings, as 
the savings to drivers are offset by a corresponding reduction in state and federal tax receipts.  
While accounting for the savings directly enjoyed by drivers, the CAT study fails to account for 
this offsetting effect on tax receipts, thereby overstating savings from the standards.  Given 
current state and federal gasoline excise taxes (37.6 cents per gallon), the standards’ forecasted 
effect on gasoline use in 2020 would reduce annual receipts of those taxes by about one billion 
dollars, affecting both California’s state budget and its receipt of federal highway funds.
46  
iii. Incorrect Valuation of How Individuals and Firms Discount Future Savings 
Analyses also may improperly estimate how individuals and firms discount the value of 
future energy savings.  Numerous economic studies of individuals’ and firms’ energy efficiency 
investments have found that the value of future savings is discounted considerably more than is 
typically assumed in bottom-up analyses of proposed policies.  For example, in one of the first 
such studies, Hausman found that consumer choices among air conditioner models imply 
discount rates of 15 to 25 percent.
47  More recently, Anderson and Newell found that 
manufacturers’ energy efficiency investment decisions suggest discount rates as great as 80 
percent.
48  By contrast, the California studies employ discount rates as low as four percent.
49  
Use of such a low discount rate may improperly increase the estimated value of future savings.  
Many studies have estimated discount rates by examining individual and firm decisions 
regarding upfront investments that yield future energy savings.  The tradeoffs between upfront 
costs and future savings that are revealed by these decisions imply specific discount rates.   
                                                 
45 CAT (2006b), p. 6.   
46 American Petroleum Institute (2006).  This estimate of taxes includes an underground storage tank fee, but 
excludes sales tax.  While there is a sales tax on gasoline in California, sales tax receipts depend on gasoline prices, 
and loss of these receipts may be offset by increased consumer expenditures on other taxed goods.  The Berkeley 
study’s description of how it estimates the impact of these standards suggests that it also fails to account for their 
effect on excise tax receipts.  Roland-Holst (2006a), p. 2-19.   
47 Hausman (1979). 
48 Anderson and Newell (2004). 
49 For example, CCAP (2006), p. 4.  
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However, investment decisions that suggest high discount rates actually may reflect the effect of 
market failures on investment decisions.  For example, a firm with a low discount rate may fail 
to invest in a beneficial energy efficiency improvement because of inadequate information about 
the savings from that investment.  Its choice to forgo this investment may therefore be 
interpreted incorrectly as evidence of a high discount rate.  In such a case, it may be appropriate 
to use a lower discount rate to evaluate a policy’s impact, even though the firm appears to use a 
higher discount rate in valuing the investment targeted by the policy.   
However, high implicit discount rates do not necessarily indicate the presence of market 
failures.  There are well-established reasons why firms and individuals should use higher 
discount rates in evaluating some investment decisions.
50 Also, high estimated discount rates 
have been found to be consistent with the rates that firms indicate they intend to use in 
evaluating investments, calling into question the idea that high estimated rates imply a failure to 
properly value future savings.
51  Moreover, regardless of the underlying cause of high estimated 
discount rates, analyses using lower rates to estimate the value that individuals and firms place 
on future savings may overestimate the effectiveness of some policies that create incentives for 
particular emission-reducing investments, but do not require those investments. 
B.  Underestimation of the Costs of Policies Necessary to Achieve Emission Reductions 
The direct costs of particular emission reduction efforts may be of little relevance if 
policies cannot elicit those efforts effectively.  Moreover, policies can introduce additional costs 
above and beyond the direct costs of undertaking the emission reduction efforts they target.  As 
we noted in Section IV, even if certain actions or investments to reduce emissions may yield cost 
savings, the cost of a policy necessary to bring about those actions or investments may exceed 
the value of those cost savings.  Further, cost savings from emission reductions can only be 
attributed to a policy if those reductions would not occur without that policy.  Therefore, the 
costs of a policy that targets potentially cost-saving measures can be underestimated (i.e., savings 
                                                 
50 For example, individuals and firms face uncertainty about the return that energy efficiency investments will earn.  
If an investment’s value cannot be fully recovered in the event that the investment is later deemed undesirable (i.e., 
the investment involves a sunk cost) and an individual or firm has the option to delay that investment, a higher 
expected return may be necessary to justify making the investment rather than delaying the investment decision.  See 
Metcalf and Rosenthal (1995); Hassett and Metcalf (1995); and Sanstad, Blumstein, and Stoft (1995). 
51 Anderson and Newell (2004).   
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from that policy can be overestimated) by failing to account for the reality that some of those 
cost savings would be realized even without the policy.  The California studies offer several 
examples of how analyses can underestimate the cost of meeting an emissions target by giving 
inadequate attention to the effectiveness and cost of the actual policies necessary to achieve 
emission reductions.   
i.  Failure to Consider the Effectiveness and Cost of Necessary Policies  
Some of the emission reductions contemplated by the California studies could be 
achieved by adjusting existing policies.  But many of the emission reductions would require 
implementation of new policies whose effectiveness and cost is not well understood.  At one 
extreme, nearly 15 percent of the 2020 emission reductions estimated by the CAT study come 
from “measures to improve transportation energy efficiency” and “smart land use and intelligent 
transportation”, including “encouraging high density … development.”
52  The study provides no 
estimate of the economic impact of such changes in development patterns (e.g., the impact of 
smaller lot sizes), or of the cost and effectiveness of policies that would seek to achieve those 
changes.     
In other cases, the California studies estimate the cost of particular actions that would 
achieve emission reductions, but do not consider the cost and effectiveness of the policies that 
are necessary to elicit those actions.  For example, all California studies consider opportunities to 
sequester CO2 through land use changes, such as afforestation.  However, as the CCAP study 
notes, significant challenges remain in developing policies that can effectively bring about such 
land use changes.
53  For example, even if their land offers low-cost sequestration opportunities, 
some landowners may not participate in programs designed to achieve sequestration because of 
associated administrative burdens and transaction costs.  Also, policies may incur costs by 
subsidizing some land use changes that would have occurred even without those policies.   
Finally, efforts to achieve sequestration through land use changes may suffer from leakage.  That 
is, land use changes in one area may bring about changes elsewhere that have offsetting effects 
on sequestration, raising the cost of achieving a given net increase in sequestration.  While 
estimating the cost of particular land use changes, the California studies do not quantify how 
                                                 
52 CAT (2006a), pp. 58-59. 
53 CCAP (2005a).  
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factors like those described above would limit the effectiveness and increase the cost of policies 
that are necessary to bring about those changes.
54  Absent an assessment of the effectiveness and 
cost of policies necessary to bring about the hypothesized changes, the California studies’ 
evaluations of emission reduction measures are of limited use.  While such evaluations may 
identify promising areas for future research, they should not be interpreted as estimates of the 
cost of actually realizing emission reductions.   
ii.  Failure to Characterize Baseline Behavior Appropriately 
A critical step in estimating a policy’s impact is determining an appropriate baseline 
against which the policy’s effects are measured.  This baseline represents the anticipated 
behavior of individuals and firms in the absence of the policy.  Given particular baseline 
behavior, a policy will only impose costs or create savings to the extent that the targeted 
emission reduction measures would not already be adopted in that baseline (i.e., to the extent that 
the policy actually has a binding effect on the behavior of regulated entities).  For example, if 
consumers would purchase more fuel-efficient vehicles even without a fuel economy standard, 
the savings and emission reductions from purchasing those vehicles are not attributable to the 
standard because they would have occurred even in its absence.  
Economic analyses often assume that, in their baseline behavior, individuals and firms 
will voluntarily adopt any emission reduction measures that have net cost savings.  Thus, by 
design, such analyses will not find opportunities for cost-saving emission reduction policies.  In 
these analyses, rather than creating cost savings, policies would have no net economic impact on 
those firms and individuals for whom the required measures reduce costs, as the analyses would 
assume that those cost-saving measures would be adopted in the baseline.  But, as we described 
in Section IV, certain market failures can prevent voluntary adoption of some cost-saving 
emission reduction measures, presenting opportunities for cost-saving policies.  Therefore, 
analyses assuming that all cost-saving opportunities are realized in the baseline may overestimate 
a policy’s costs (by underestimating opportunities for cost savings) if such market failures are 
present and significant, and can be addressed efficiently through policy intervention.   
                                                 
54 Recognizing the important implications of these factors, other analyses have at least made admittedly ad hoc 
adjustments to their cost estimates.  For example, in estimating the cost of a U.S. climate policy proposed in Senate 
Bill 139 (the Climate Stewardship Act of 2003), the EIA assumed that only half of the estimated agricultural and 
forestry sequestration opportunities would be available at any given cost.   U.S. DOE, EIA (2003), p. 245.  
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Whereas many economic analyses of climate policies assume that market failures that 
offer cost-saving opportunities are not present, analyses like the California studies depend on the 
presence of such market failures to reach the conclusion that policies would create cost savings.  
That is, they assume baseline behavior that — according to their own estimates — does not take 
advantage of all cost-saving opportunities, and thereby leaves opportunities for cost-saving 
policies.  However, the extent to which baseline behavior would not take advantage of cost-
saving opportunities depends fundamentally on the nature and extent of relevant market failures, 
about which there is substantial uncertainty and much debate (see Section IV).  Indeed, as is the 
case with the California studies, analyses that find opportunities for cost-saving policies typically 
do not rely on explicit characterizations of relevant market failures in estimating baseline 
behavior and resulting cost savings from a policy.
55  Rather, such analyses’ assumptions about 
baseline behavior and estimates of resulting cost savings from a policy imply that unspecified 
market failures are present and sufficiently large to make the assumed baseline behavior and 
estimated policy cost savings plausible.  Thus, in principle, these analyses may overestimate 
(underestimate) the cost savings and emission reductions from a policy if they assume baseline 
behavior that overstates (understates) the extent of relevant market failures.    
The possibility that baseline behavior may be characterized incorrectly is a particularly 
significant source of potential error when seeking to estimate a policy’s impact many years into 
the future.  In fact, there is a tension in many studies that find substantial opportunities for cost-
saving emission reduction policies.  These studies often assume that technological advances will 
reduce relevant technologies’ costs in future years, creating substantial cost-saving opportunities.  
But the studies simultaneously assume that market failures are sufficiently large that those 
opportunities will not be realized without policy intervention.  Consequently, even if such studies 
develop accurate estimates of the future costs of emission-reducing technologies or actions, they 
nonetheless may underestimate the cost of (overestimate cost savings from) emission reduction 
policies  by incorrectly characterizing the extent of market failures and resulting baseline 
behavior.  That is, these studies may incorrectly attribute particular emission reductions and 
                                                 
55 By contrast, other market distortions, such as taxes, can be (and are) explicitly and quantitatively characterized in 
analyses in order to estimate their implications for baseline behavior and for a proposed policy’s economic impact.    
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associated cost savings to a policy when, in fact, those reductions and savings would occur even 
without that policy.
56  
The California studies’ estimates of the impact of California’s vehicle GHG emissions 
standards offer an example of how flawed forecasts of baseline behavior can lead to significant 
overestimation of savings from a policy.  The studies’ estimates are based on CARB’s analysis 
of those standards.  In turn, to estimate the standards’ effects, CARB forecasts the future baseline 
behavior of California consumers, including the fuel-efficiency of vehicles that they would 
purchase and the amount that they would drive in the absence of those standards.  Together with 
estimates of future gasoline prices and technology costs (among other factors), CARB’s forecast 
of baseline behavior leads to its estimate of net cost savings resulting from the standards.  In its 
original analysis, CARB’s forecast of baseline behavior and its resulting estimate of net cost 
savings from the standards are based, in part, on its assumption that future gasoline prices would 
be $1.74 per gallon.
57  In light of the recent higher level of gasoline prices, CARB performed an 
additional analysis in which it assumes a higher gasoline price of $2.30.  Yet, despite using a 
gasoline price that is 32 percent higher than that in its original analysis, CARB does not revisit 
its assumptions about consumers’ baseline vehicle purchases and driving habits.  That is, the 
only adjustment that CARB makes to its analysis in order to account for a much higher gasoline 
price is to proportionately increase its estimate of the value of gasoline savings from those 
standards, while assuming that the volume of gasoline savings remains the same.
58  The CAT 
study takes the same approach in adjusting CARB’s original analysis to account for the Climate 
Action Team’s expectation that gasoline prices in 2020 will be $2.12, rather than CARB’s 
original estimate of $1.74.
59   
Neither CARB nor the CAT study consider that significantly higher gasoline prices 
would cause consumers to voluntarily adopt more fuel-efficient vehicles and to drive less, 
                                                 
56 While inaccurate forecasts of baseline behavior would lead to incorrect estimates of the amount of emission 
reductions that is attributable to a policy, they would not necessarily lead to incorrect estimates of the absolute level 
of emissions resulting from a policy’s implementation.  A policy may ensure that a particular emissions level is 
achieved (e.g., by setting a cap on emissions) regardless of the extent to which emission reductions necessary to 
meet that level are attributable to the policy, rather than to baseline behavior.   
57 CARB (2004a), p. xi. 
58 CARB (2004a), as revised in CARB (2004b), Table 12.7-1.   
59 CAT (2006b), pp. 3, 6.  While the CAT study reports its gasoline price assumption in constant 2003 dollars, here 
we report that price in constant 2004 dollars to make it comparable with CARB’s price forecast.   
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reducing the standards’ effect on gasoline consumption, and thereby reducing cost savings from 
the standards.  Thus, assuming that CARB’s original forecast of baseline behavior is appropriate 
for a $1.74 gasoline price scenario, both CARB’s analysis of the $2.30 price scenario and the 
CAT study overestimate net cost savings from the standards by failing to account for how 
baseline behavior would adjust to much higher gasoline prices.
60   
Careful analysis is needed to evaluate precisely how alternative fuel prices would affect 
baseline behavior and the resulting impact of California’s standards.  However, simplified 
calculations can offer an indication of the extent to which the California studies overestimate 
savings from those standards under higher fuel price scenarios.  In particular, we focus on 
CARB’s overestimation of savings under the $2.30 gasoline price scenario. 
To estimate how a higher gasoline price could change baseline fuel economy levels and 
vehicle miles traveled (VMT), we use estimates of the price elasticity of fuel economy and VMT 
that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) employed in a 2003 study.
61  Given these elasticity 
estimates, the 32 percent increase in the price of gasoline from $1.74 to $2.30 per gallon would 
lead to a 6.4 percent increase in baseline fuel economy and to a 5.5 percent reduction in VMT.
62  
CARB estimates that its standards will increase the average fuel economy of vehicles that are in 
use in 2020 to 21 percent above its forecast of baseline fuel economy when gasoline is $1.74 per 
gallon.
63  Thus, the standards would only increase fuel economy by 14 percent relative to the 
higher baseline fuel economy level that would result from a $2.30 gasoline price.  Moreover, the 
effect of this fuel economy improvement on gasoline consumption would be diminished by the 
reduction in baseline VMT.  All told, the adjustment in baseline behavior in response to a $2.30 
                                                 
60 The CCAP study relies on CARB’s $2.30 price scenario analysis.  CCAP (2006), p. 13.   The Berkeley study does 
not indicate whether it relies on CARB’s $1.74 price scenario analysis or its $2.30 price scenario analysis.  
61 The price elasticities of fuel economy and VMT measure the percentage change in fuel economy and VMT, 
respectively, that results from a one percent increase in gasoline prices. The CBO assumed that, in the long-run, a 
one percent increase in gasoline prices would lead to a 0.22 percent increase in average fuel economy, and to a 0.2 
percent reduction in VMT.  Together, these estimates imply a long-run price elasticity of demand for gasoline of  
-0.39, which is consistent with other existing estimates of that price elasticity.  CBO (2003), p. 12.    
62 These values assume that the price elasticities of fuel economy and VMT are constant across all price levels.  
63 This value is derived from CARB’s estimate of the standards’ effect on 2020 vehicle emissions (which are related 
to fuel consumption).  CARB (2004a), as revised in CARB (2004b), Table 8.2-1.  The percentage increase in 
average fuel economy continues to grow beyond 2020 because the standards are not fully phased in until model year 
2016.  The standards’ full effect will not be realized until all earlier model year (less fuel-efficient) vehicles are 
replaced by vehicles meeting the 2016 standards.   
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gasoline price would reduce CARB’s estimate of the volume of fuel savings attributable to the 
standards in 2020 by more than 35 percent.
64  Without accounting for any adjustment in baseline 
behavior under the $2.30 price scenario, CARB estimates that the standards will offer drivers $7 
billion in fuel savings in 2020.
65  Therefore, assuming that CARB’s original forecast of baseline 
behavior under the $1.74 price scenario is correct, our calculations indicate that the California 
studies overstate annual savings from the vehicle GHG emissions standards by billions of dollars 
because they fail to account for the effect of higher gasoline prices on baseline behavior.
66   
Our calculations also demonstrate that the total value of fuel savings from the standards 
under some higher fuel price scenarios can be lower than the value of savings under lower price 
scenarios.  That is, the reduction in the volume of fuel savings from the standards under a higher 
fuel price can outweigh that higher price’s effect on the value of those savings.  Based on our 
calculations, the value of annual fuel savings attributable to the standards in 2020 under the 
$2.30 price scenario would be nearly one billion dollars less than the savings under the $1.74 
price scenario.  
iii. Implications of Cost Uncertainty for the Reliability of Deterministic Analyses of 
Cost-Saving Policies 
The California studies’ overstatement of cost savings from the vehicle GHG emissions 
standards highlights another reason why analyses finding cost-saving policy opportunities may 
underestimate costs.  Even if an analysis of a cost-saving policy correctly forecasts baseline 
behavior in the scenario it examines, it may underestimate the policy’s expected costs by failing 
to account for the implications of cost uncertainty, and particularly how baseline behavior may 
adjust to greater-than-anticipated cost savings.   
                                                 
64 The corresponding reduction in the volume of fuel savings under the CAT study’s forecast of future gasoline 
prices would be more than 25 percent.  
65 CARB (2004a), as revised in CARB (2004b), Table 12.7-1.    
66 Along with reducing fuel savings attributable to the standards, adjustments in baseline fuel economy would reduce 
the standards’ incremental effect on vehicle costs.  However, under the $2.30 price scenario, CARB estimates that 
the value of fuel savings resulting from the standards is more than five times greater than the corresponding increase 
in annualized vehicle costs.  Moreover, some of the reduction in fuel savings attributable to the standards under the 
higher fuel price scenario result from changes in baseline VMT, rather than changes in baseline fuel economy.  
Thus, the reduction in fuel savings attributable to the standards that results from these adjustments in baseline 
behavior would be far greater than the corresponding reduction in the standards’ impact on vehicle costs.   
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As is the case in the California studies, a policy’s costs are typically estimated using a 
deterministic analysis, which develops a single cost estimate based on “point estimates” of 
relevant underlying determinants and a single forecast of baseline behavior.  For example, 
CARB’s analysis of California’s vehicle emissions standards estimates costs relative to one 
baseline scenario based on point estimates of technology costs, fuel prices, and other cost 
determinants.  But there is typically significant uncertainty in the determinants of a policy’s 
costs, including baseline behavior.   
In principle, by failing to account for this cost uncertainty, a deterministic analysis can 
either underestimate or overestimate the expected (or average) value of a policy’s potential 
future costs (or savings).
67  However, in the case of policies targeting cost-saving emission 
reduction opportunities, deterministic analyses will tend to overestimate systematically the 
expected value of a policy’s cost savings (i.e., underestimate the expected value of its costs).  
This conclusion arises from a full consideration of how baseline behavior responds to changes in 
the magnitude of emission reduction opportunities. 
If cost savings from targeted emission reduction measures turn out to be greater than 
anticipated, baseline behavior will likely adjust to realize some (if not all) of those cost-saving 
opportunities, mitigating the extent of cost savings that the policy itself offers.  At the extreme, 
when the cost savings offered by targeted actions are greatest, a policy may have no binding 
effect on individual or firm behavior, and therefore no economic impact.  As a result, while a 
deterministic analysis would overstate a policy’s cost savings if cost-saving opportunities turn 
out to be lower than expected, that analysis may not understate the policy’s cost savings to the 
same extent if cost-saving opportunities turn out to be greater than expected.  Indeed, in the latter 
case a deterministic analysis would overstate the policy’s cost savings if cost-saving 
opportunities turn out to be so great that they would be realized without policy intervention.  
Thus, accounting for the full distribution of possible policy impacts suggests that deterministic 
analyses will tend to overestimate the expected cost savings (i.e., underestimate the expected 
costs) of seemingly cost-saving policies.  
                                                 
67 The expected value of a policy’s costs can be estimated more accurately by using a probabilistic analysis, which 
estimates the full distribution of potential costs (based on uncertainties in underlying determinants).  For a 
discussion of circumstances in which deterministic estimates can differ from the expected value of a policy’s costs, 
see Jaffe and Stavins (2004).    
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A simplified example of a fuel economy standard illustrates the problem.  Assume there 
are two vehicles with different fuel efficiencies and that a proposed standard would require 
consumers to purchase the more fuel-efficient vehicle.  Given expected technology costs and fuel 
prices, a deterministic analysis finds that the more fuel-efficient vehicle offers the typical 
consumer savings of $100 over the vehicle’s lifetime, accounting for both the vehicle’s higher 
cost and resulting fuel savings (see Table 2).  The analysis also finds that, because of a market 
failure, the consumer nonetheless would choose the less fuel-efficient vehicle absent the 
standard.  The deterministic analysis therefore estimates that the standard would yield $100 in 
savings for the typical consumer.  However, assume there are two additional equally likely 
scenarios.  In the second scenario, where technology costs are lower and/or fuel prices are higher 
than anticipated, the consumer would save $600 by purchasing the more fuel-efficient vehicle.  
In the third scenario, where technology costs are higher and/or fuel prices are lower than 
anticipated, the consumer would incur $400 in costs by purchasing that vehicle.   
In this example, the deterministic estimate of the standard’s impact is the same as the 
expected value of the savings from adopting the more fuel-efficient vehicle, given the three 
possible future scenarios.  That expected value is $100 in savings — the average of $600 in 
savings, $100 in savings, and $400 in costs.  But the deterministic estimate of the standard’s 
impact will equal the expected value of the standard’s impact only if the typical consumer would 
not voluntarily purchase the more fuel-efficient vehicle under any of the scenarios.  This is 
because it is only under those circumstances that the expected value of the standard’s impact is 
the same as the expected value of the savings from adopting the more fuel-efficient vehicle.  If, 
however, the opportunity for $600 in savings would cause a typical consumer to purchase the 
more fuel-efficient vehicle voluntarily, then the standard would not affect her behavior in that 
scenario, and thereby would offer no savings.  As a result, while a deterministic analysis would 
suggest that the standard offers the typical consumer $100 in savings, the expected value of the 
standard’s impact would, in fact, be a cost of $100 — the average of $0 (no impact), $100 in 
savings, and $400 in costs. 
        As the above example demonstrates, if individuals’ and firms’ baseline behavior 
adjusts to changes in the level of cost-saving opportunities from emission reduction measures — 
and economic analysis shows that it typically does — then deterministic analyses of seemingly  
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Table 2 
Comparison of Deterministic Estimate of the Cost of a Hypothetical Fuel Economy Standard with the  
Expected Value of that Standard’s Cost Under Different Assumptions About Consumers’ Baseline Behavior 
(Cost Estimates Account for Technology Costs and Offsetting Fuel Savings and Are for a Typical Consumer) 
 
If Consumer Never 
Voluntarily Chooses More 
Fuel-Efficient Vehicle
If Consumer Voluntarily Chooses 




100% -$100 -$100 -$100
Low Technology Cost/
High Fuel Price Scenario
33% -$600 -$600 $0
Average Technology Cost/
Average Fuel Price Scenario
(Basis for Deterministic Estimate)
33% -$100 -$100 -$100
High Technology Cost/
Low Fuel Price Scenario
33% $400 $400 $400
-$100 -$100 $100
*Note:  Negative values indicate net savings.
Expected Value from Three Scenarios
(Probability-Weighted Average)
Probability 
Relative Cost of 
More Fuel-
Efficient Vehicle*
Cost of Standard Requiring More Fuel-Efficient Vehicle*
Deterministic Analysis of Cost:  
Full Distribution and Expected Value of Possible Costs:   
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cost-saving policies will tend to underestimate those policies’ expected costs.  The extent of such 
underestimation will depend on how sensitive baseline behavior is to changes in cost-saving 
opportunities, among other factors.  In turn, the sensitivity of baseline behavior to changes in 
cost-saving opportunities will depend, in part, on the nature and extent of market failures that 
affect baseline behavior.  Thus, accurate estimation of the impacts (and desirability) of 
potentially cost-saving policies requires both consideration of cost uncertainty and a far better 
understanding of the market failures that those policies seek to address than currently exists.  The 
California studies do not explicitly account for cost uncertainty, which raises additional concerns 
regarding the reliability of their estimates. 
C.  Summary of Flaws Causing the California Studies to Underestimate Costs  
The California studies suffer from numerous flaws that cause them to underestimate 
significantly the true cost of meeting California’s 2020 emissions target.  In estimating the cost 
of emission reduction efforts, these studies omit key components of costs and overstate the social 
value of savings from resulting reductions in energy use.  In addition to underestimating the cost 
of particular actions that can reduce emissions, the California studies also underestimate the cost 
and fail to consider the effectiveness of some of the policies that are necessary to bring about 
those actions.  This is particularly problematic for those policies that are known to face 
significant implementation challenges.  Furthermore, the policies examined by the California 
studies can yield cost savings only if market failures prevent individuals and firms from 
voluntarily undertaking the cost-saving measures that those policies target.  Otherwise, one 
would expect that those cost-saving measures would be realized even without the policies.  But 
the California studies do not offer any evidence that market failures are sufficiently large to 
make the estimated cost savings plausible.  Thus, even if the California studies’ cost estimates 
for particular technologies or actions were correct, the studies may incorrectly forecast baseline 
behavior, leading them to underestimate policies’ costs by overstating any savings that those 
policies may offer.  In fact, the studies clearly underestimate the cost of California’s vehicle 
GHG emissions standards as a result of a flawed forecast of consumers’ baseline behavior.  
We have not attempted to quantify the implications of all of the problems that we have 
identified.  However, our analyses found that a few of these flaws each lead to underestimation 
of annual costs on the order of billions of dollars.  Other problems, whose effects we could not    
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quantify, may have equally significant implications.  Thus, as a result of the cumulative effect of 
these flaws, the California studies do not offer a reliable basis for estimating the cost of meeting 
California’s 2020 emissions target.  
Despite the issues described above, some of the measures examined by the California 
studies may nonetheless offer cost-effective means of achieving California’s 2020 target.  That 
is, while they may be more costly than the California studies suggest, some of the measures still 
may be among the least costly means of achieving that target.  But additional improved analyses 
are needed to better inform policymakers regarding the economic implications of such measures.  
VI. Policy Lessons from Evaluating the California Studies  
The ultimate cost of California’s climate policy will depend fundamentally on policy 
design decisions that have not yet been made.  While California’s Global Warming Solutions Act 
of 2006 sets a target for 2020 emissions, it leaves many critical aspects of policy design 
unresolved, such as emission targets for the years leading up to and following 2020, the emission 
sources that will be covered by regulation, and the policy instruments that will be used to achieve 
emission targets (e.g., market-based policies or performance and efficiency standards).  These 
and many other important design decisions will be made in the coming months and years.  
The California studies do not directly examine the economic implications of alternative 
policy designs.  Moreover, by suggesting that the 2020 target can be achieved at no cost, they 
may foster a policymaking approach that does not reflect the significant stakes associated with 
the decisions that lie ahead — both in terms of unnecessary costs that may be incurred and 
savings that may be foregone if policies are poorly designed.  In light of this, analyses focusing 
on the implications of alternative policy designs are particularly needed.  In the meantime, some 
important lessons emerge from our evaluation of the California studies.  In this section, we 
discuss lessons relating to uncertainty regarding the cost of meeting emission targets, and to the 
design of cost-effective policy.  As we describe below, some of the most important policy design 
lessons do not depend on the extent to which opportunities for no-cost emission reduction polices 
exist, or whether the California studies have substantially underestimated costs.    
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A.  Uncertainty Regarding the Cost of Meeting Emission Targets  
Even if the flaws identified in the California studies are corrected and additional analyses 
are performed, significant uncertainty will remain regarding the cost of meeting California’s 
2020 emissions target.  This is because further analysis cannot resolve many sources of 
uncertainty that are inherent in forecasts of future costs, such as uncertainty regarding future fuel 
prices, technological advances, and economic growth.   
It is particularly important for policymakers to recognize the magnitude of cost 
uncertainty because the consequences of imprecisely estimating emission reduction costs are far 
greater for some policy designs than for others.  For example, in the presence of cost uncertainty, 
rigid adherence to particular standards or emission targets increases the risk that policies will 
cause undesirable economic consequences.  An inflexible cap on NOx  emissions established 
under California’s RECLAIM program led to a dramatic increase in that program’s costs in 
2000, which contributed to California’s electricity crisis.
68  Similarly, in the presence of cost 
uncertainty, sector-specific standards can present greater economic risks than would a broad-
based (i.e., economy-wide) emissions cap-and-trade system.  Compared with an economy-wide 
cap-and-trade system, such standards give regulated entities less flexibility to respond to 
unexpectedly high costs by adjusting the distribution of emission reduction efforts across and 
within sectors.   
B.  Importance of Considering the Cost-Effectiveness of Individual Policies 
In evaluating a set of policies designed to achieve a particular objective, such as 
California’s 2020 emissions target, policymakers should carefully evaluate the cost-effectiveness 
of each policy.  By focusing on the aggregate impact of a portfolio of policies, the California 
studies divert attention from the question of which individual policies should be pursued to 
achieve California’s 2020 emissions target at least cost.  Nonetheless, careful examination of the 
California studies demonstrates just how important it is for policymakers to consider the 
individual merits of each component policy.  For example, while the Berkeley study estimates 
that the vehicle GHG emissions standards and building energy efficiency programs and standards 
will yield significant cost savings, three of the remaining six policies that it examines are 
                                                 
68 See Joskow (2001).    
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estimated to have an average impact of reducing 2020 GSP by about $300 per ton of CO2 
equivalent.
69  It makes little sense to conclude that these relatively costly measures are desirable 
simply because they are grouped with other measures that are estimated to create economic 
benefits.  The significant variation in the estimated cost-effectiveness of policies examined by 
the California studies reinforces the fact that the choice and design of specific policy measures 
will critically affect the cost of California’s climate policy.   
C.  A Cost-Effective Framework for Climate Policy 
Much of the debate spurred by analyses like the California studies focuses on the costs of 
meeting specific emission targets.  In addition to leading policymakers to flawed conclusions 
about the costs of meeting emission targets, such studies also may lead policymakers to ill-
informed conclusions about the relative merits of alternative policy instruments for achieving 
those targets.  As in the case of the California studies, those bottom-up analyses that yield 
significantly lower cost estimates than do many other economic analyses of climate policy often 
do so when analyzing a standards-based, sectoral policy approach.  By contrast, other economic 
analyses that find higher costs often focus on analyzing market-based policies, such as cap-and-
trade systems.  Yet the differences in cost estimates and in the types of policy instruments 
examined by these analyses should not be interpreted as an indication that a standards-based, 
sectoral approach to climate policy would be a less-costly alternative to economy-wide market-
based policies.  In fact, regardless of one’s beliefs about the extent of no-cost emission reduction 
opportunities, careful consideration of the different market failures that cause excessive GHG 
emissions should lead to the same conclusions about a cost-minimizing policy framework.   
Emission reductions can be achieved by addressing several fundamentally different 
market failures.  The core market failure contributing to excessive GHG emissions is the failure 
of individuals and firms to internalize the social cost of their emissions.  Bottom-up analyses 
concluding that no-cost emission reduction opportunities exist reach this conclusion because of 
assumptions about an additional set of market failures.  These additional market failures may 
prevent individuals and firms from making certain cost-saving decisions — such as with regard 
to energy efficiency investments — that would also reduce emissions.       
                                                 
69 Roland-Holst (2006a), Tables ES-1 and ES-2.    
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The fact that the core market failure leading to excessive emissions is the failure of 
individuals and firms to internalize the cost of their emissions suggests that a market-based 
policy, such as a cap-and-trade system, should be the core policy instrument employed.  By 
creating a price signal that reflects the social cost of emissions, market-based policies can 
address this core market failure far more cost-effectively than can standards or other policy 
approaches.  The economic logic leading to this conclusion is completely independent of debates 
about the prevalence of no-cost emission reduction opportunities.   
Whereas a market-based policy should cover as many emission sources as possible in 
order to minimize the costs of meeting a given emissions target, the possibility that there may be 
some no-cost emission reduction opportunities suggests that additional, carefully targeted 
policies should be considered.  Such policies should serve as complements, rather than 
alternatives, to a market-based policy because they address fundamentally different market 
failures.  For example, even if a firm internalizes the cost of its emissions, inadequate 
information may still cause it to forego some cost-saving energy efficiency investments that 
would reduce emissions.  Similarly, even if policies effectively address a market failure that 
prevents a firm from making some cost-saving investments, that firm’s emissions still will be too 
high if it does not internalize the cost of those emissions.  Moreover, while complementary 
policies addressing these additional market failures may offer some no-cost emission reduction 
opportunities, none have claimed that those opportunities are sufficiently abundant to permit 
achievement of long-run emission goals.   
Additional policies also can be established to cover emission sources and sinks that 
cannot be targeted effectively by a core market-based policy.  For example, difficulties 
measuring and monitoring biological sequestration of CO2 and some non-CO2 GHG emissions 
may hinder their direct inclusion in a cap-and-trade system.  As we noted earlier, in part because 
of these difficulties, the California studies underestimate the cost of policies targeting 
sequestration and reductions in some non-CO2 GHG emissions.  Nonetheless, in concluding that 
these opportunities are important sources of low-cost reductions in net emissions, the California 
studies are consistent with prior analyses of national climate policy.
70  Thus, in this respect, the 
                                                 
70 See U.S. DOE, EIA (2003); U.S. DOE, EIA (2005); Reilly, Jacoby, and Prinn (2003); Stavins and Richards 
(2005); and Lubowski, Plantinga, and Stavins (2006).    
37 
California studies are valuable in reinforcing the need to explore how climate policy can 
effectively bring about sequestration and non-CO2 GHG emission reductions.   
The policy framework described above would ensure that policy costs are minimized, 
regardless of the extent to which no-cost opportunities exist.  However, several points should be 
considered in evaluating complementary policies that target no-cost emission reduction 
opportunities.  To be efficient, such policies must be tailored very carefully to reflect the specific 
market failures that they seek to address.  For example, if property owners forego cost-saving 
energy efficiency investments because of inadequate information, this may call for different 
corrective policies than if they forego such investments because they would not receive sufficient 
compensation from their tenants.  Moreover, unlike the failure of individuals and firms to 
internalize the social cost of their emissions, market failures that create no-cost emission 
reduction opportunities often call for narrowly targeted policy interventions.  For example, a 
frequently cited market failure that may offer no-cost emission reduction opportunities is the fact 
that landlords may not have appropriate incentives for energy efficiency investments if their 
tenants pay the utility bills.
71  Yet less than one-quarter of U.S. residential energy consumption 
occurs in rented — as opposed to owner-occupied — housing units.
72 
To develop complementary policies that efficiently target no-cost opportunities, 
policymakers need better information about the nature and extent of the market failures that lead 
to those opportunities.  Bottom-up analyses like the California studies have the potential to 
inform the development of such policies, but caution is in order.  First, while bottom-up analyses 
may suggest the presence of market failures by finding cost-saving opportunities, they typically 
do not offer definitive evidence of such failures.  These analyses may incorrectly identify no-cost 
opportunities because of flaws such as those described in Section V.  Second, even if market 
failures are present, bottom-up analyses rarely offer any clear insight regarding the nature and 
full extent of those failures.  But such information is essential for the evaluation of policy 
options.  The cost of standards that might be developed to address these market failures depends 
critically on the nature and extent of those failures.  Finally, if complementary policies would 
affect emission sources that are also covered by a market-based policy, such as a cap-and-trade 
                                                 
71 For example, see Brown (2001). 
72 U.S. DOE, EIA (2001).    
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system, evaluations of such complementary policies would need to focus on the policies’ 
incremental effects.  Energy efficiency investments that regulated entities would make in 
response to a cap-and-trade system presumably would diminish remaining opportunities for no-
cost investments that complementary policies could target.   
D.  A Safety Valve Allows Policy Design to Account for Different Beliefs About Costs 
While consideration of the different market failures that lead to excessive GHG emissions 
should point to the same cost-effective policy framework regardless of one’s beliefs about no-
cost emission reduction opportunities, undoubtedly it will be difficult to reach agreement on 
appropriate emission targets within that framework.  However, it may be easier to reach 
agreement on the maximum cost that should be incurred to achieve near-term emission 
reductions, given the long-term nature of the climate problem.  In light of this, a cap-and-trade 
system can be designed in a way that bridges the gap between those who believe that aggressive 
near-term targets can be met at no cost, and those who believe that such targets may impose 
unacceptable economic consequences.  A cap could be set to reflect the aggressive targets that 
some analyses (like the California studies) suggest can be achieved at minimal or no cost, and a 
safety-valve provision could ensure that costs do not exceed what both groups deem to be the 
maximum acceptable level.  A safety valve achieves this cost protection by guaranteeing that an 
unlimited number of emission allowances would be made available by the government at a pre-
determined price.  While firms would still undertake all emission reductions necessary to meet 
the cap that are less costly than the safety valve’s “trigger price,” the safety valve ensures that 
allowance prices — and thereby costs incurred to reduce emissions — will never rise above this 
trigger price.  Although the debate about emission reduction costs cannot be easily resolved, a 
cap-and-trade with a safety valve can at least reduce the stakes of that debate by dramatically 
reducing the consequences of underestimating costs.  
VII.  Conclusions 
Analyses of the costs of emission reduction policies offer important insights that can 
inform the development of climate policies in California and elsewhere.  Economic analysis 
indicates that while most emission reduction measures will impose costs, the presence of market 
failures affecting energy efficiency may present some opportunities for low-cost or even no-cost    
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emission reduction policies.  But there is substantial debate about the extent of such market 
failures and about our ability to address them through economically efficient policy intervention.   
Some analyses suggest that these market failures present opportunities to achieve 
substantial emission reductions at no net cost.  The three California studies that we evaluate in 
this paper are the latest to make this claim.  But analyses finding substantial no-cost 
opportunities may reach such a conclusion by incorrectly calculating the true economic costs of 
emission reduction policies.  Indeed, a careful examination of the California studies reveals that 
they underestimate the cost of meeting California’s 2020 emissions target as a result of numerous 
flaws.  While quantifying the full extent of this cost underestimation is beyond the scope of our 
study, that underestimation is clearly economically significant.  A few of the flaws individually 
lead to underestimation of annual costs that is on the order of billions of dollars.  The California 
studies also overstate the emission reduction potential of the policies that they examine, in part 
because they fail to account for offsetting increases in emissions (i.e., emissions leakage) that 
those policies would bring about within and outside of California.  As a result, we conclude that 
the California studies do not offer reliable estimates of the cost of meeting California’s 2020 
emissions target.  Better analyses are needed to inform policymakers.    
The ultimate cost of meeting California’s 2020 emissions target will depend both on the 
underlying cost of emission reduction measures and on many aspects of the design of 
California’s policies that remain to be determined.  The debate about opportunities for no-cost 
emission reduction policies is unlikely to abate, but this debate is irrelevant to some important 
lessons for climate policy design.  Specifically, in designing policy, policymakers should 
recognize and account for the substantial uncertainty that characterizes emission reduction costs.  
Even if debates about the accuracy of particular analyses were to be resolved, many other critical 
and unresolvable sources of cost uncertainty would remain.   
Also, debate about opportunities for no-cost emission reduction policies should not 
influence the choice of an appropriate framework of policy instruments to minimize the cost of 
achieving emission targets.  Market-based policies, such as cap-and-trade systems, are the most 
cost-effective means of addressing the core market failure leading to excessive GHG emissions:     
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the failure of emitters to internalize the social cost of their emissions.  A market-based policy 
should therefore be the core policy instrument employed to achieve California’s emissions target. 
The California studies’ findings of no-cost emission reduction opportunities emerge from 
assumptions about different market failures.  To the extent that these other market failures exist, 
they call for additional policies that could complement a market-based policy.  However, to 
develop complementary policies that efficiently target no-cost opportunities, policymakers need 
better information and analysis than currently exists regarding the market failures that bring 
about those opportunities.   
While the debate about opportunities for no-cost emission reductions will undoubtedly 
continue into the future, a well-designed market-based policy can facilitate consensus on climate 
policy despite this debate.  By setting aggressive caps and establishing a safety valve to protect 
against cost uncertainty, a cap-and-trade system can bridge the gap between those who believe 
aggressive near-term emission targets can be met at no cost, and those who maintain that 





American Petroleum Institute.  2006.  “State Gasoline Tax Reports.”  October. 
 
Anderson, Soren and Richard Newell.  2004.  “Information Programs for Technology Adoption: 
The Case of Energy-Efficiency Audits.”  Resource and Energy Economics 26(1):  27-50. 
 
Brown, Marilyn.  2001.  “Market Failures and Barriers as a Basis for Clean Energy Policies.”  
Energy Policy 29(14):  1197-1207. 
 
California Air Resources Board (CARB).  2004a.  Staff Report:  Initial Statement of Reasons for 
Proposed Rulemaking, Public Hearing to Consider Adoption of Regulations to Control 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Motor Vehicles.  August 6. 
 
_______.  2004b.  Addendum Presenting and Describing Revisions to:  Initial Statement of 
Reasons for Proposed Rulemaking, Public Hearing to Consider Adoption of Regulations 
to Control Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Motor Vehicles.  September 10.    
 
California Climate Action Team (CAT).  2005.  Draft State Agency Work Plans.  December 8. 
 
_______.  2006a.  Climate Action Team Report to Governor Schwarzenegger and the 
Legislature.  March. 
 
_______.  2006b.  Documentation of Inputs to Macroeconomic Assessment of the Climate Action 
Team Report to the Governor and Legislature.  January. 
 
California Energy Commission (CEC).  2003.  Proposed Energy Savings Goals for Energy 
Efficiency Programs in California.  100-03-021.  October.   
 
Center for Clean Air Policy (CCAP).  2005a.  Activities and Policies to Enhance Forest and 
Agricultural Carbon Sinks in California.  October 14. 
 
_______.  2005b.  Reducing CO2 Emissions from California’s Cement Sector. October 14. 
 
_______.  2006.  Cost Effective GHG Mitigation Measures for California: Summary Report.   
January 19. 
 
Congressional Budget Office.  2003.  The Economic Costs of Fuel Economy Standards Versus a 
Gasoline Tax.  December. 
 
Gillingham, Kenneth, Richard Newell, and Karen Palmer.  2006.  “Energy Efficiency Policies:  
A Retrospective Examination.”  Annual Review of Environment and Resources 31:   
161-192.  
    
42 
Hassett, Kevin and Gilbert Metcalf.  1995.  “Energy Tax Credits and Residential Conservation 
Investment:  Evidence from Panel Data.”  Journal of Public Economics 57(2):  201–217. 
 
Hausman, Jerry.  1979.  “Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and Utilization of Energy-
Using Durables.”  The Bell Journal of Economics 10(1):  33-54. 
 
Huntington, Hillard, Lee Schipper, and Alan Sanstad.  1994.  “Editors’ Introduction.”  Energy 
Policy 22(10):  795-797.   
 
Interlaboratory Working Group.  1997.  Scenarios of U.S. Carbon Reductions:  Potential Impacts 
of Energy-Efficient and Low-Carbon Technologies by 2010 and Beyond.  Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee and Berkeley, California:  Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Lawrence 
Berkeley National Laboratory.  September. 
 
_______.  2000.  Scenarios for a Clean Energy Future.  Oak Ridge, Tennessee and Berkeley, 
California:  Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.  
November.  
 
Jacoby, Henry.  1999.  “The Uses and Misuses of Technology Development as a Component of 
Climate Policy.”  In Climate Change Policy:  Practical Strategies to Promote Economic 
Growth and Environmental Quality.  Washington, DC:  American Council for Capital 
Formation Center for Policy Research.  May.    
 
Jaffe, Adam, Richard Newell, and Robert Stavins.  1999.  “Energy-Efficient Technologies and 
Climate Change Policies:  Issues and Evidence.”  In Climate Change Economics and 
Policy:  An RFF Anthology, ed. Michael Toman.  Washington, DC:  Resources for the 
Future Press. 
 
Jaffe, Adam, Richard Newell, and Robert Stavins.  2003.  “Technological Change and the 
Environment.”  In Handbook of Environmental Economics, Volume I, ed. Karl-Göran 
Mäler and Jeffrey Vincent, Chapter 11, 461-516.  Amsterdam:  Elsevier Science.  
 
Jaffe, Adam, Richard Newell, and Robert Stavins.  2005.  “A Tale of Two Market Failures:  
Technology and Environmental Policy.”  Ecological Economics 54(2-3):  164-174. 
 
Jaffe, Adam and Robert Stavins.  1994.  “The Energy Efficiency Gap:  What Does It Mean?” 
Energy Policy 22(10):  804-810.    
 
Jaffe, Judson and Robert Stavins.  2004.  “The Value of Formal Quantitative Assessment of 
Uncertainty in Regulatory Analysis.”  Washington, DC:  AEI-Brookings Joint Center for 
Regulatory Studies, Related Publication 04-22. September. 
 
Joskow, Paul.  2001.  “California’s Electricity Crisis.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 17(3):  
365-388. 
    
43 
Loughran, David and Jonathan Kulick.  2004.  “Demand-Side Management and Energy 
Efficiency in the United States.”  Energy Journal 25(1):  19-41. 
 
Lubowski, Ruben, Andrew Plantinga, and Robert Stavins.  2006.  “Land-Use Change and 
Carbon Sinks:  Econometric Estimation of the Carbon Sequestration Supply Function.”  
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 51(2): 135-152. 
 
Metcalf, Gilbert and Kevin Hassett.  1999.  “Measuring the Energy Savings from Home 
Improvement Investments:  Evidence from Monthly Billing Data.”  The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 81(3): 516–528. 
 
Metcalf, Gilbert and Donald Rosenthal.  1995.  “The ‘New’ View of Investment Decisions and 
Public Policy Analysis: An Application to Green Lights and Cold Refrigerators.” Journal 
of Policy Analysis and Management 14(4):  517–531. 
 
Reilly, John, Henry Jacoby, Ronald Prinn.  2003.  Multi-Gas Contributors to Global Climate 
Change:  Climate Impacts and Mitigation Costs of Non-CO2 Gases.  Arlington, Virginia:    
Pew Center on Global Climate Change.  February.  
 
Roland-Holst, David.  2006a.  “Economic Assessment of Some California Greenhouse Gas 
Control Policies:  Applications of the BEAR Model.”  In Managing Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions in California, ed. Michael Hanemann and Alexander Farrell, Chapter 2.  
University of California at Berkeley:  The California Climate Change Center.  January.  
 
_______.  2006b.  “Economic Growth and Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in California.”  
University of California at Berkeley:  The California Climate Change Center.  August.  
 
Sanstad, Alan, Carl Blumstein, and Steven Stoft.  1995.  “How High Are Option Values in 
Energy-Efficiency Investments?” Energy Policy 23(9):  739–743. 
 
Sanstad, Alan, Michael Hanemann, and Maximillian Auffhammer.  2006.  “End-Use Energy 
Efficiency in a ‘Post-Carbon’ California Economy:  Policy Issues and Research 
Frontiers.”  In Managing Greenhouse Gas Emissions in California, ed. Michael 
Hanemann and Alexander Farrell, Chapter 6.  University of California at Berkeley:  The 
California Climate Change Center.  January. 
 
Stavins, Robert and Kenneth Richards.  2005.  The Cost of U.S. Forest-Based Carbon 
Sequestration.  Arlington, Virginia:  Pew Center on Global Climate Change.  January. 
 
Schumpeter, Josef.  1942.  Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.  New York:  Harper. 
 
Sutherland, Ronald.  2000.  “‘No Cost’ Efforts to Reduce Carbon Emissions in the U.S.: An 
Economic Perspective.”  Energy Journal 21(3):  89 - 112. 
 
United States Department of Energy (DOE), Energy Information Administration (EIA).  1998.  
Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy Markets and Economic Activity. October.    
44 
 
_______.  2001.  2001 Residential Energy Consumption Survey. 
 
_______.  2003.  Analysis of S.139, the Climate Stewardship Act of 2003.  June. 
 
_______.  2005.  Impacts of Modeled Recommendations of the National Commission on Energy 
Policy.  April.  
 
United States Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.  
2006.  “Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks Model Years 2008-2011; 
Final Rule.” Federal Register 71(No. 66, April 6):  17566. 